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Abstract
In this paper a new class of graphical Bayesian discrete semi-Markov
models is developed to describe the various pathways that might lead
someone into perpetrating various kinds of crime involving assault and
violence. Our discrete probability models are crafted to embody various
theory and empirical studies by psychologists and sociologists explaining
and describing this development. This probability model is then used
to formally structure a new decision support system to help authorities
evaluate public risks guided by not only archived but real time data. We
argue here that such systems will be able to provide provisional quantified
evaluations of the impacts of various policy and policing decisions into
the short and medium term. The construction of such probability models
is illustrated throughout by examples. We end the paper with a more
detailed description of a model built to support authorities to frustrate
populations of criminals who have been radicalised into violent extremism.
Acknowledgement We are indebted to Rob Procter for pointing us
towards critical related references in Machine Learning.
1 Introduction
In this paper we develop a new probabilistic framework for describing how a
subpopulation Ωt of the general public might be drawn into an assault crime.
This framework enables us to leverage recent advances in forensic science, es-
pecially in the evaluation of the strength of activity level evidence see e.g. [4,
19, 22, 45] and reapply these to this domain. Our models describe how different
sequences of generic events - either unplanned or as the result of life decisions
- encourage an individual ω ∈ Ωt into or discourage them away from these
criminal activities.
Because of the unbalanced nature of the evidence in this domain it is neces-
sary to embed structured information in the form of sociopsychological theory.
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These theories view the adoption of a life of crime as a process. Each individual
responds in a rational way to their environment and is driven by their needs and
aspirations. An extensive library of information that has been collected about
the life history of different classes of violent criminals informs these studies.
These need to be embedded into a Bayesian statistical modelling framework to
underlie any formal tool developed to support the evaluation of policy options to
prevent as many people as possible from getting involved in violent crime. This
statistical framework needs on the one hand to be sufficiently detailed to be able
to capture the wide variety of possible developments in the lives of criminals
that make them dangerous and be able to distinguish these from the various
innocent developments in the lives of the vast majority of people. On the other
hand it must be sufficiently coarse and generic to classify those diverse subpop-
ulations of individuals who might in the future pose a threat to public safety.
Then standard Bayesian decision analytics [56] can be used to formally evaluate
evidence in this domain and to support operational and resource deployment
decisions in this area. This paper describes and illustrates how this challenge
can be met.
We argue here that expert judgments about criminal population dynamics
are well described through event trees and dynamic time inhomogeneous semi-
Markov processes customised to this domain. To do this it is necessary to
further develop the graphical technologies of Chain Event Graphs (CEGs), and
especially their dynamic variants [8, 19, 21].
Standard dynamic extensions of the now established CEG methodology have
been Markov rather than semi-Markov [21]. Except for a short discussion of
technical apparatus in [8] the current development of these models is in its
infancy. This is the first paper to explore the use of this technology to the
type of domain we face here. Semi-Markov models rather than Markov models
are needed because social and psychological models of criminal behaviour are
usually articulated in terms of ordered sequences of events within an unfolding
process. Within such descriptions - where evidence from different case studies
is drawn together - the time it takes to move between adjacent states in the
unfolding process tends to vary from subject to subject within a study and can
be dependent on their environment - often invisible to an observer. On the other
hand, an observer’s probability that an individual makes his next transition
from one situation to another can often be assumed to be more stable across
the population. It therefore makes sense to structure expert judgments around a
direct description of the list of transitions a person might make when in a given
state. At least within the class of problems we have examined this structural
information appears less contentious and links directly to the natural language
explanations various criminologists use to express their theories.
Once a framework (or competing frameworks) of this kind have been spec-
ified, the next delicate task is to somehow harness relevant information and
expert judgments to specify a distribution on the probability vector of a partic-
ular type of individual transitioning into an adjacent state. These probabilities
are clearly highly dependent not only on the population being examined but the
type of assault being considered. In this paper we illustrate various different
2
ways this can be achieved through a sequence of examples, before developing
certain templates for general use. Within the developed class of models, the fi-
nal component concerning the length of time it might take before an individual
makes such a transition is typically added only at the end of analysis when and
if this most fragile component of the analysis is needed.
One critical challenge is that some of the individuals within the general public
will be well known to the authorities whilst others may be totally invisible. For
known individuals we are able to perform a person centred Bayesian analysis.
However for the others we have to rely on a population study where population
statistics are uncertainly inferred from the life histories of similar individuals
and general criminological hypotheses, and these situations often need to be
handled differently [38].
The next section motivates this work through two illustrative person cen-
tred Bayesian analyses of different assault crimes. We illustrate how models of
individual crimes, previously developed estimation and model selection method-
ologies can be straightforwardly modified and translated into this domain and
demonstrate the use of a new class of models called the Reduced Dynamic Chain
Event Graphs (RDCEGs). Drawing on a selection of sociological and psycholog-
ical studies in Section 3 we proceed to define a generic framework around which
such crimes can be discussed and formalised into a probability model based on a
new family of Dynamic CEGs (DCEGs). This involves us building a number of
random variables that indicate on an ordinal scale several components loosely
related to the means, motivation and opportunity of an individual criminal. In
Section 4 some of the inferential challenges associated with this model class are
explored.
Leaning on some current sociological insights, in Section 5 we then focus
down the study to a specific domain that lies within these broader classes.
More detailed RDCEG frameworks are built for a specific genre of assault crime:
Radicalisation leading to Violent Extremism (RVE). We show how the graphical
framework enriches the expression of early naive escalation models used for this
domain whilst being sufficiently structured to admit a later embellishment into
a full probabilistic class. We end the paper by illustrating these constructive
frameworks with reflections on a real study. We outline how to perform this
probabilistic embellishment to a full class of Bayesian models needed to inform
a particular decision support system: one designed to evaluate different policies
designed to discourage a progression into RVE. In particular we illustrate how
to seamlessly transition between population models and generic person centred
models within this class. The paper ends by describing how this work is currently
being applied to build new support systems needed to pursue violent criminals.
The standard depictions of this family of DCEGs, whilst still applicable to
this domain, tend to become rather cluttered. So in the next section we begin
this study by defining a simple new set of bespoke representational rules.
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2 The activity graph of a criminal
2.1 The RDCEG to model a single criminal
We begin by reviewing the CEG and the established extensions of this statistical
family of models. We then develop these methodologies so that it can be applied
to describe the evolution of criminal behaviour. Chain Event Graphs [6, 19, 57]
and their dynamic extensions [8, 21, 32] have now been established to provide a
simple but powerful representation that can be used to describe a semi-Markov
process. The class of models is based on an event tree. In its dynamic form this is
an infinite tree whose vertices and edges are coloured to represent various types
of context-specific conditional independence assertions. These can not only form
the framework for principled personal models of a single individual but also of a
model of a population of potential criminals. For a detailed description of this
particular aspect of this technology for the standard CEG see Chapter 5 of [19].
Within our context the potential development of each person within the
population Ωt at time t of people who might be drawn into assault crime at some
point in the future is described by a path along the edges of this tree beginning at
its root. The vertices of this tree express various discretely classified situations
where each individual might lie at any given time. Elicited criminological models
are often concerned with how someone at a particular situation in their life might
transition into either a new situation of escalated threat or into a more benign
state. These positions - defining a set of comparable situations - then form the
states of the associated semi-Markov process of the crime. Within the DCEG
technology and semantics two situations or vertices of the event tree and their
emanating edges in the tree share a colouring if the set of transition probabilities
associated with colour identified edges are hypothesised to be the same.
The event tree so coloured is called a staged tree. In the cases we consider here
this tree can be of infinite depth. One finite graph that describes this infinite
tree is called a DCEG. This means that the entirely formal features of the
hypothesised discrete stochastic model specifically its underlying semi-Markov
structure and additional conditional independence assertions can be expressed as
a finite coloured directed graph which transparently and evocatively represents
the underlying criminal development. The construction of a DCEG is formally
and extensively described in [8, 20, 21, 32]. The vertices of a DCEG are called
its positions. These are sets of comparable situations in the original infinite
depth staged tree. When two situations lie in the same position we hypothesise
that the probability law describing the future unfolding of events for a person
arriving at either of these situations can be identified.
This graph has already proved to be a very useful framework for faithfully
eliciting hypotheses concerning how things might happen. This framework can
then, after close discussions with domain experts be examined and adapted
until the expert is satisfied that the framework expresses a plausible hypothesis.
This discussion can be conducted using only natural language and so does not
disempower the domain expert - here the expert in the developmental stages
describes the development of a person into being prepared to enact a certain
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type of assault crime. Only once this framework is in place is a probability
model built around it.
Thus here we demonstrate how the graph of a particular variant of a DCEG,
the RDCEG can provide not only a transparent description of the possible
evolutions of someone in the given population - a collection of unfolding histories
which take them from one broad category to another as we move along the
paths of the graph - but also one which admits a probabilistic embellishment
that can then support a quantification of the degree of risk presented by a
particular individual. The vertices of the graph correspond to a critical point in
the evolution of someone within the population whilst hypotheses about such
transitions are expressed directly by the edges of the graph between a finite
number of broadly defined vertices. For dynamic models with homogeneous
transitions this diagram turns out to be a simple but powerful embellishment
of the familiar state transition diagram of a finite Markov process. Here are
two very simple examples of how this process can be used to describe two very
different sorts of assault crime.
2.1.1 A non dynamic CEG directly applied to a criminal process
The first example is of the simplest possible case where the repeated acts of
a single identified potential perpetrator of a crime can - at least in the first
instance - be legitimately expressed in terms of a finite tree. This enables us
to use as our framework a vanilla CEG [19] with no adaptation. The simplicity
of this example allows us to transfer directly Bayesian methods for forensic
inference concerning activity level evidence - see [4, 22, 26, 27, 56].
Example 1 A man is suspected of child entrapment. He is accused of initiating
a sequence of long electronic chat sessions with a young girl. Over the 50 day
period he was observed, 18 of these days he engaged in an electronic chat lasting
over an hour with a particular minor. Police were suspicious that these calls
were designed to groom this child into an eventual meet. The suspect claims
to the contrary that the conversations which actually initiated by the girl, were
entirely innocent and that he was simply trying to humour her. To investigate
the issue further, police have obtained from the suspect’s and also his wife’s
employer a record of which of those 50 days each of the couple had been away on
business. The unfolding events on each day can be represented using the staged
tree given in Fig. 1.
In such cases the path followed on any one day is uncertain. Here, for
example, contacts by either party may not lead to a chat. One party may not be
able to chat for some unrecorded reason and just because someone was recorded as
being away or not does not necessarily imply that a chat was or was not possible.
However, given their suspicions, police would expect that proportionately more
chats would occur when the suspected man and his wife were recorded as being
together - i.e. on days leading to situations given in green (s4, s5, s6) rather than
for the situation given in pink (s3) in the staged tree in Fig. 1. The CEG in
Fig. 2 is based on the police suspicions that the node w1 which constitutes the
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Figure 1: Staged tree for example 1.
situations s4, s5, s6 lies in a different stage than the node w2 which constitutes
the situation s3 indicating that the probability of a chat happening would be much
lower, the suspect being frustrated from making contact by the presence of his
wife. However - unless the girl has some way of divining when the suspect would
be remote from his wife - under the suspect’s explanation of events situations
s3, s4, s5 and s6 would lie in the same stage as shown in Fig. 3. So we have two
competing probability models shown by the two CEGs in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 that
provide competing hypothesised explanations of events. Note that, following good
practice [19] the CEGs below we have only included events whose distribution
might be different under the competing hypotheses. So for example we have
drawn together into a single vertex all the ways the wife and suspect could be
separated when the suspect might be free to contact the girl. This is possible
because under both competing hypotheses these different scenarios appears to
have no discriminatory information about the innocence or guilt of the suspect.
Note that both hypotheses - expressible in natural language - are represented
accurately and succinctly by the two graphs. However both graphs also formally
express the structures of the probability models underpinning the two hypothe-
ses. Collected data can be used both to estimate the edge probabilities on the
critical events under either hypothesis. These help to guide the calculation of
the extent to which one hypothesis is more plausible than the other: e.g. in this
simple case a hypothesis test on a 2× 2 table or a standard Bayes Factor score.
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Figure 2: CEG for example 1 based on police suspicions.
Figure 3: CEG for example 1 based on the suspect’s claims.
Assume for example that the only relevant or admissible data available is given
in the units of days the man and wife are together or separated on that day and
whether or not a long chat happened expressed via the contingency table below.
The hypothesis of independence would then be consistent with the hypothesis
that child was initiating the contacts whilst the (one sided) alternative of the
positive association between a chat taking place and the separation of the man
and his wife would be consistent with the police hypothesis.
No Chat Chat
Couple Together 25 2 27
Couple Separated 7 16 23
32 18 50
Applying Bayes Factor model selection methods described in detail in Chap-
ters 5 & 6 of [19] with a default uniform prior on the leaves of the staged tree
above and assuming random sampling over the 50 days the marginal likelihood
ratio of this activity data is:
l , P (Data|Suspect’s Innocence)
P (Data|Suspect’s Guilt) =
Γ(29)Γ(25)Γ(34)Γ(4)Γ(20)
Γ(26)Γ(3)Γ(8)Γ(17)Γ(54)
=0.000085729
For the data above this would give what Aitken [4] would advise that there
was strong evidence in the support of the police suspicions. An elementary
application of Bayes rule gives us that if p0 is a juror’s prior probability of the
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suspect’s guilt then
P (Suspect’s Innocence| Data)
P ( Suspect’s Guilt| Data) = l
p0
1− p0
It can be checked that even by giving the suspect the benefit of the doubt, any
formal analysis of the data above provides strong evidence in the favour of the
police version of the process for most rational jurors. This illustrates how data
can be formally incorporated into an analysis to discriminate between innocent
interactions and guilty ones and the sorts of arguments applied by forensic
scientists in preparing their submission to court about strength of evidence. For
the decision support we envisage here - where the primary aim is not to convict
but to determine whether or not resources should be deployed to frustrate the
activities of a particular suspect - such analyses are even more clear cut.
This model could of course be embellished into a more nuanced CEG. For
example we could choose the parameters of the beta prior to reflect informa-
tion that might be available concerning the number of days the players would
normally be away from home. More subtly the police may conjecture that the
couple would try to be together as much as possible in normal circumstances
leading them to be together more than randomly which is what would be ex-
pected if the suspect were innocent. On the other hand if he were grooming the
girl he may be trying to optimise his time away from his wife. So separation
would then be more probable than by chance. The scope for choice would need
to be informed by experts and so any analysis would be very context-specific.
But all these embellishments could be explored and populated with hard evi-
dence if this was thought necessary. Notice that all these embellishments can be
specified as answers to questions asked in natural language - as can its outputs
[56]. It is only when it is necessary to determine the strength of evidence for and
against contending hypotheses that any numerical elicitation or analyses need
to be performed. This is what makes this technology so useful to domains like
the ones we discuss here.
The point of this type of analysis is two fold. First it guides the system-
atic collection of data. If the man is eventually arrested then natural language
translations of this analysis can form the basis of a prosecution case in court.
This application is now becoming widely used in the presentation of forensic
evidence in courts of law: albeit usually using the framework of the BN. Per-
haps even more useful is to apply this sort of analysis to help determine how
to best allocate resources to prevent such unfolding events culminating in an
actual assault. In the context above where there are a number of suspicious
engagements being observed the framework can be used to support police pri-
oritise the pursuit of collections of different suspects to maximise the number of
potential perpetrators they are able to frustrate. Generalisations of this latter
type of use will be the focus of this paper.
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2.1.2 Extending the crime to model with the RDCEG
A typical criminal ω ∈ Ωt may at some point drops out of a life of crime -
for example because of changing circumstances, repentance, arrest or death. In
fast moving single sequences of engagements like the one above this absorbing
state has little impact on inferences. However in other examples it will have.
Furthermore the man in the example above may have the opportunity to repeat
his suspicious behaviour patterns with different victims indefinitely often. When
this is a significant possibility an alternative dynamic framework needs to be
used see e.g. [8, 20, 21, 32].
In this paper it is convenient to modify the established graphical semantics
because we can assume an absorbing state - called here the immune state i -
always exists and can be transitioned to from many states in these criminal pro-
cesses. The new graphical representation does not depict i explicitly because by
definition edges can only point into this state. A reduced DCEG (RDCEG) can
therefore be constructed from the subgraph of a DCEG obtained by omitting
the immune vertex and all edges into it in the DCEG. The RDCEG therefore
has one less vertex and far fewer edges than the standard graph of a DCEG.
This simple device turns out to be very useful in this criminal setting because
the depiction of the processes is much less cluttered. It also enjoys some pleas-
ing formal properties [52]. Note that when there is always a small probability
that a person becomes immune then the full graph of a DCEG can always be
reconstructed from the RDCEG. In distinction to the DCEG, when we add edge
probabilities to quantify the description these probabilities emanating from a
particular vertex these often sum to a value strictly less than one. This loss of
probability weight then implicitly quantifies the probability that at their next
transition a suspect will cease this particular criminal activity for ever, i.e. will
transition into i, the immune state.
Example 2 Typically in cases like the ones above the entrapment will end at
some point. The child may end the communication, the man gives up or the
child and the man meet. In any of these circumstances, the man may repent or
be arrested - transitioning into an immune state - or he may begin to explore a
new contact. This process will continue until such time as the man reaches i,
where by definition he will stay. This typical scenario can model such extended
hypotheses using an RDCEG. The simplest such model is given in Fig. 4.
When the other party to a chat with the suspect is known to be a child then
under the model hypothesis depicted above leads us to construct a number of
separate records of the type collected in the first example. Under the simplest
hypothesis that the innocence or otherwise of the chat does not depend on the
child, these can be aggregated into a common contingency table just like the one
given above. Such evidence can then be collected until the current time or the
absorbing state is reached and used to further strengthen the case against the
suspect. In this way expected probabilities can be added to each of the directed
edges corresponding to the transition probabilities of an associated semi-Markov
process. So now well developed inferential methodologies [19] then transfer seam-
lessly into this new framework: see [52] for a more explicit description of this
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Figure 4: RDCEG for example 2. After reaching position w3, the unit traverses
back to the position w0 under the assumption that it does not enter the immune
state i in the next transition.
transfer.
The next example is of a very different assault crime and illustrates a more
nuanced dynamic. To keep things simple we again begin the modelling process
just before a potential crime threatens to be committed and where there is a
single potential perpetrator of the crime.
Example 3 Police have strong evidence that suggests that woman A has decided
to take revenge on man B by shooting him. At any given time she will be trained
to shoot (s) or not (s) and will own a gun (g) or not g. She can take various
courses of action. She could choose to try to learn to shoot now - if she currently
does not know how to - in a condition where she currently owns a gun ts(s, g)
or not ts(s, g). Alternatively she could immediately try to acquire a gun at a
time when she has either trained to shoot (tg(s)) or not (tg(s)). At any point
in this process she may enter the immune state i: for example B may be killed
by someone else or A may have a change of heart or be arrested and deported.
Note that A can only perpetrate the crime when in state (s, g). A possible model
of this process is depicted by the RDCEG in Fig. 5.
Figure 5: RDCEG for example 3.
Its vertices represent all the possible states in the process other than i. Note
that this RDCEG is simply the state transition graph of a semi-Markov process
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defining the dynamic with the absorbing state i and all edges into it deleted.
When ordering the states - called its positions - of this Markov process as
(ts(s, g), (s, g) , (s, g) , tg(s), tg(s), (s, g) , ts(s, g), (s, g) , i)
the configuration of zeroes in the transition matrix of the corresponding semi-
Markov process is given below
0 ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 ?
0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 ?
∗ 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 ?
0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 ∗ ?
0 0 ∗ 0 0 ∗ 0 0 ?
0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 ?
0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 ∗ ?
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ?
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ?

. So the uncoloured graph of an RDCEG given above directly depicts the struc-
ture of the transition matrix implicit in our natural language description of the
process. Note that the sum Σk of the probabilities in the ∗ entries on row k
of this matrix will be no larger than 1 with 1 − Σk ≥ 0 being the probability A
enters the absorbing state i from the kth position shown by ? in row k. A full
probability model of the process - always consistent with the natural language
description encoded by the RDCEG - is then provided by simply adding proba-
bilities to the starred entries along the rows of the structured transition matrix
above. This is a device we use throughout this paper to translate criminological
theory and instances into a probability model.
There are various important points to make about this class. First although
the graph of the RDCEG is evocative and expresses a hypothesised model ex-
pressed in natural language fully and precisely its implicit Markov assertions
are nevertheless very substantive. In particular the states = positions define
the parts of the history that need to be remembered to forecast the future. A
critical issue here is to get these states right. Technically a random variable
which takes different values at each state at any given time has been assumed
to be predictively sufficient. So in the example above, how A arrived at any
of the positions has no relevance to the subsequent development once she gets
there.
If for example on the contrary it is believed that if A tried to shoot twice and
failed then she would give up for ever then the state space given above would not
be valid. The set of positions would then need to be increased and redefined so
that they remembered whether or not the suspect had tried twice or not giving
a different RDCEG representing a competing hypothesis. Note the benefits of
one hypothesis over the other can be discussed in natural language. So - just
as for the BN - these graphs can be used directly to analyse the logical and
qualitative predictive consequences of such hypotheses. The type of dialogue
11
between expert and analyst is intrinsic to the process of structural decision
analysis and the examination of competing hypotheses central to the elicitation
processes discussed in this paper. A technological development to do this for a
CEG, is now well established. The RDCEG can be used in exactly the same
way and interrogated without having to first elicit any probabilities: see e.g. [8,
19, 58] until a structurally requisite model is discovered [56].
Once an RDCEG has been elicited and embellished with transition prob-
abilities, with complete random sampling on the transition events alone data
can be used within a conjugate analysis for fast estimation and model selection
just as in the entrapment case above. The formulae for these are given in an
appendix and discussed in more detail in [52].
Note that the RDCEG is much more than a state space diagram of a semi-
Markov process because the colouring of its vertices and edges is able to convey
critical additional conditional independence information about the process. This
type of additional information is often intrinsic to the domain specific models
we describe here. Fortunately it is precisely because of this property that the
RDCEG inherits most of the technologies originally developed for DBNs. On
the other hand one advantage the RDCEG has over BN technologies is that it
explicitly depicts zero transitions into all states other than the immune state.
Within crime models such zero transitions typically form a central part of the
unfolding story.
For the purposes if this paper it is only necessary to illustrate this colouring
- a formal detailed exposition of this process can be found in [8, 19, 20, 52].
Depending on our construction protocol these colours are either inherited from
an elicited staged tree or added to positions after the graph has been elicited.
In the example above suppose the criminologist hypothesises that the two prob-
abilities P (ts(s, g) → s, g) of A learning to shoot when not owning a gun and
P (ts(s, g) → s, g) when owning a gun are the same as are P (ts(s, g) → s, g) of
not learning to shoot with no gun and P (ts(s, g) → s, g) when owning a gun.
This qualitative information can be depicted on the RDCEG simply by assign-
ing the same colour to positions ts(s, g), ts(s, g), to the edges ts(s, g) → s, g
and ts(s, g) → s, g and to the edges ts(s, g) → s, g and ts(s, g) → s, g [8,
19]. Within DBN technologies such local structure is sometimes referred to
as a ”context-specific conditional independence” assumption or as defining an
”object” [41].
Ideally we would like to construct default RDCEG templates of collections
of different criminal process indexed by type of criminal, and type of crime,
that build on existing criminological models. To build such a library takes some
effort but is quite possible. This type of technology has for example already
well developed for BNs within the context of forensic science, see [4, 27] and
established frameworks of processes linking activities with evidence. In this
paper we illustrate how some of these RDCEG templates can be built to help
model crimes associated with assaults or violence against the general public.
A template RDCEG associated with a single criminal, particular crime and
demographic may have many more positions than the ones illustrated above and
defined more generically so that information across different past cases can be
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drawn together. In the next section we demonstrate how this can be done.
3 Generic features of a criminal RDCEG
3.1 Means, Motive, Opportunity
An old legal check list for examining the culpability of a suspect is given by
their “means, motive and opportunity”. Traditionally all of these should be
present if a prosecutor has a chance of convincing a jury of a suspect’s guilt
in a court of law. Here we will use this simple aide memoir to help template
some of the structural features of general RDCEGs associated with violent or
assault crimes. We then illustrate how these templates can be refined to model
radicalisation leading to violent extremism.
First in such crimes someone needs to be motivated to enact an assault.
In our first example the issue of the man’s motivation under the two different
hypotheses was implicit for both versions of the recent history. Under the police
hypothesis he was motivated in the second he was not. In the gun example we
had assumed that the potential killer was already motivated. In practice the
motivation of a person however may be much more nuanced. If the aim is to
prevent an individual being drawn into crime motivational escalation will be of
primary interest.
Second such a person needs to have the means or capability to carry out an
attack. In the first example he simply needed a laptop or electronic devise and
know how to use this in an appropriate way. But in the second we saw that she
needed the training (to shoot) and tools (a gun) to perpetrate the act. In more
complex crimes an assailant often needs to embed themselves in a gang or at
least be in intimate contact with like-minded criminals. For example if someone
chooses to act as a mule in a bombing incident then this will usually need the
potential perpetrator to embed themselves in a gang with the skills to make a
bomb. Such a gang will often be made up of different, often diversely motivated
and skilled criminals.
The final component of the process is the suspect has the opportunity. This
feature is much more immediate and critical to police operations but less so for
example for social services. It is again convenient to split this attribute into
two components. The first relates to the victims. In the entrapment example,
the suspect need to find someone to trap. In the second he must have access
to his target. The bomber - possibly through his gang - must have identified a
vulnerable place to perpetrate the incident. The second component associates
to the assailant. In the first the man’s wife or some other potential observer
cannot be present or he will be frustrated. In the second the attacker needs
to currently own a gun and be somewhere near the planned victim. For the
bomber the materials to make the bomb acquired, the bomb needs to be built
and then transported to the target. It is often convenient to think of opportunity
only to be relevant if motive and means are already in place. The frustration
of opportunity is either directed at general threats and systematically enacted,
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for example the introduction of new laws, codes of practice and protocols that
better protect the general public from such an assailant. This is often termed a
Protect policy. Alternatively it could be frustrated through the active Pursuit
of potential perpetrating individuals or gangs of criminals. The examples above
illustrate these points well.
Only with all three elements in place at least to a sufficiently high degree
can a crime be perpetrated. Furthermore the impact of the crime also depends
on the levels of all three of these components. So again we have quite a compli-
cated set of mutually exciting states which determine the severity of the threat
posed by a particular individual. Here we first construct escalating scales of
threat guided by elaborations of the three principles above. The complexity of
these scales needs to trade off the specificity of the template to enable critical
evidence informing judgments in a given instance to be accommodated against
the extreme variety of incidents and actors that make it sufficiently generic to
be useful. We illustrate the simplest generic RDCEG templates of two types of
assault crime and describe how these can be embellished and customised to a
particular real scenario. We then discuss how this structure can be populated
with a formal probability model to accommodate expert judgments and any
available sample information. We end by discussing and illustrating how this
analysis can be used for decision support - especially about resource allocation
by combining information in these distributions with the utility of a user to score
various portfolios of policies. This helps assess the effectiveness of various re-
source deployment strategies by providing tentative scores to various portfolios
of future remedial actions for domain scrutiny, adaptation and adoption.
Of course no one single template will fit all types of assault crime. However
by focusing on states that capture motivation, means and opportunity we find
that surprisingly few generic templates are needed to describe a wide class of
different processes and to help inform the types of decision making discussed
above. In the remainder of this paper for simplicity we will focus mainly on the
first two attributes.
3.2 Escalation into assaults on the general public
3.2.1 Motivation
There is now a vast corpus within both the psychological and sociological litera-
ture describing a vast variety of theories about how someone can be drawn into
a life of violent crime: see for example, [11, 15] and references therein. A very
brief review of the literature associated with one sort of violent crime is given
below. At the most basic level there are two critical attributes of such people:
their preparedness to engage in crime and their preparedness to assault another
person. Obviously both need to be in place before the criminal is motivated to
perpetrate an assault.
Two escalating scales classifying someone’s self perception in relationship
to general society are given below. These components are labelled alienation
and violence and measure of someone’s preparedness to sympathise with or
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engage in assault of a fellow human being [59]. Here, for convenience, these
scales are described in terms of answers to an imaginary questionnaire a suspect
might be asked to use to best describe their attitude. This scale has been
informed by similar escalation lists within Social Movement Theory (SMT) [66]
and its application to a particular criminal group [14, 28] now translated in a
way that enables the scale that can be readily transformed into an event space
of a probability model. In particular the alienation scale below expands the
escalating SMT scale given in [65] who label these states of mind “openness to
new world views” - a3, a4, “religious/political seeking” - a5, “frame alignment”
- a6 and “indoctrinated” - a7, a8.
3.2.2 Alienation
1. I am content with my life and its trajectory and the normal evolution of
mainstream society, a1.
2. I am dissatisfied with my current life and am currently looking for better
opportunities within it, a2.
3. I am disaffected with my life chances; there seems to be no future for me,
a3.
4. Society must change; it cannot currently support right thinking people like
me, I am an alien and need to align myself to a group of other outsiders
a4.
5. Mainstream society could never change appropriately within usual demo-
cratic processes. Revolutionary change is needed to transform it so that
people with whom I am aligned can participate, a5.
6. Current mainstream society - its agents and its participants - is my enemy;
its processes and people need to be actively undermined, a6.
7. Any acts - criminal or not - that attack and undermine the current order
are fully justified; I wholeheartedly support those with whom I am aligned
who are prepared to take such acts, a7.
8. Those who do not align with my perspectives are to be despised. My
personal vocation is to align everyone to my world view using all means
possible within my own moral compass, a8.
3.2.3 Violence
1. I would never knowingly physically harm someone or support anyone else
doing this, v1.
2. I could envisage circumstances when I could support someone assaulting
someone else but I could never perpetrate this act myself, v2.
3. In extreme circumstances I might be prepared to assault someone myself,
v3.
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4. Whenever necessary I will reluctantly personally assault another person,
v4.
5. I am quite happy to physically assault someone if necessary, v5.
6. I am eager to assault someone if given the opportunity, v6.
In practice a suspect could not be assumed to complete these two question-
naires truthfully if really asked! However it is still useful to refect on what
someone might report if they were honest. This then provides an event that
passes the Howard’s Clarity Test [37, 56] that can be then legitimately assigned
a probability by someone else. (The suspect if asked and motivated to be honest
could provide their preferred answer at any given time.)
An outsider will often not usually be able to supply the suspect’s answer to
these questions, unequivocally. However government should be able to specify
its joint probability distribution on these two attributes and so calculate its
probability distribution on the motivation scale for criminal assault discussed
below. In fact it often turns out that someone’s observed behaviour is strongly
informative about where they are positioned on both of these scales: a suspect’s
own social network communications might even volunteer this information!
Even for an unknown person within the population some data will inform
a probability distribution defined over similar individuals. For example people
within the population who have been out of work or are underemployed are
more likely to feel alienated from society. Similarly anyone recently having
visited a war zone is much more likely to be unusually acculturated to violence
and assault. Note that for both lists most combinations of pairs of states in
these escalating gradation a person is no threat whatever to the general public.
Indeed many religious people would identify themselves at the point a4, whilst
a soldier would typically place themselves on rung v4 or v5.
3.2.4 Combining Alienation and Violence
Someone’s motivation to violence is not usually a linear function of these com-
ponent attributes. Except for the last moral setting we need both a sufficient
level of alienation and an acquiescence to personally commit a violent act. This
means that any simple combined additive score of these two attributes will not
work well. However it is straightforward to propose a plausible non-linear func-
tion such as the one below - introduced for illustrative purposes. This function
expresses coarse categories of violent motivation - listed in escalating order -
(immune, m0, benign, m1, open to adopting, m2, aligned, m3, enactor, m4) as
a function of their alienation and violence - that might be used to inform a
potential perpetrator’s threat.
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Alienation\Violence v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6
a1 m0 m0 m0 m0 m0 m0
a2 m0 m0 m1 m1 m1 m4
a3 m0 m0 m1 m1 m1 m4
a4 m0 m0 m1 m1 m2 m4
a5 m0 m0 m2 m2 m2 m4
a6 m0 m0 m2 m2 m2 m4
a7 m0 m0 m2 m3 m4 m4
a8 m0 m0 m4 m4 m4 m4
3.2.5 Means
A potential perpetrator needs means as well as motive to enact a violent crime.
In this context means can be helpfully split into two elements - one we call
training/skills and the other an embeddedness within a facilitating group and a
remoteness from other inhibitory human contacts.
Training to perpetrate a particular crime personally: Note that there
may be various skills to add here such as ability to fight, use a knife, shoot, make
a bomb or develop a biological weapon. So depending on context we may need a
refinement of type of training. We illustrate this type of customised embellish-
ments in later examples. Here we present the simplest and most generic scale.
Training is a resilient attribute - once trained someone cannot be untrained, at
least in the time frames we envisage in our applications.
1. Untrained in playing a role r in a criminal assault of type g.
2. Partially trained to enact r in a criminal assault of type g.
3. Fully trained to enact r in a criminal assault of type g.
Embedded in criminal fraternity: Assault criminals often at least benefit
and sometimes need facilitation. One simple measurable scale of this social dy-
namic - which in any given context can in principle and with enough information
be formally and unambiguously determined is given below.
1. Not meeting every two weeks with other similarly or more motived like
minded criminals and embedded in contacts with immune people.
2. Meeting every two weeks remotely, for example electronically with sim-
ilarly or more motived like minded criminals and embedded in contacts
with immune people.
3. Meeting every two weeks electronically and physically with similarly or
more motived like minded criminals while in full contact with immune
people.
4. Meeting every two weeks electronically and physically with similarly or
more motived like minded criminals and contact with immune people re-
duced by at least 50% from two years ago.
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5. Meeting regularly electronically and physically with similarly or more mo-
tived like minded criminals and contact with immune people reduced to
less than 10% from two years ago.
In many contexts “like minded” individuals will equate with being affiliated
to some criminal organisation constituting a gang or brotherhood of believers.
Embedding of course goes hand in hand with motivation each excites the other
in the perpetration of violent crimes. However for modelling purposes it is useful
to separate these two. Remedial acts or external events can change or disrupt
a suspect’s embedding immediately whilst decreasing motivation tends to move
only slowly. We note that such embedding can already be in place because of
the suspect’s kinships or naturally evolving friendship groups.
For most assault crime perpetrated by a group, for example for a bombing,
skills and embedding will both need to be present to an appropriate level before
it is possible to commit the crime.
3.2.6 Opportunity
Opportunity in the sense we use here presents immediately before a crime is
committed. So especially in a gang crime this links closest to the Pursuit,
Protect and Recovery phase of an attack. Almost by definition an opportunity
can develop or be frustrated very suddenly. In court cases the use of an alibi -
often based on time and location - is often central to establishing no opportunity
could have existed for someone to have committed a particular crime. On the
other hand if a suspect can be shown that it is likely he was at the scene of the
crime then this can be central to a prosecution case.
Here how we might choose to define opportunity depends very closely on the
nature of the crime in question as are the countermeasures that might be taken
to minimise the possibility of presenting the suspect with an opportunity. A
generic template can therefore only be quite coarse. However for most assault
crime we nearly need two indicators to be positive:
1. A vulnerable target of the assault has been identified by the potential
perpetrator (perhaps through his fraternity).
2. A team (possibly of one) of suitably skilled assailants that can plan, pre-
pare and carry out the assault is currently in place.
Opportunity can of course be affected by prophylactic measures to safeguard
potential targets whether these are children - as in the first example - or protect-
ing the potential victim in the second. However actions to frustrate opportunity
in the short term often require intervention by the police. This is summarised
in Fig. 6.
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Figure 6: The computation graph summarising the process described above.
3.3 RCEG Templates for Assault Crime: Pursuit
3.3.1 Introduction
The Markov nature of these paths of an RDCEG building on the motivation,
current modus operandi of perpetrators, histories of past criminals and knowl-
edge of developing environments ensures two different individuals ω, ω′ ∈ Ωt
classified as having reached the same “position” in their lives, i.e. for whom
wt(ω) = wt(ω
′) at t, will by definition respect the same probability law over
their future participations in incident cluster if given the same subsequent ex-
ternal stimuli.
For simplicity the next two examples coarsen the above scales and our pop-
ulation Ωt is restricted to those currently in the most threatening radicalised
states: when suspects need to be actively pursued. In the diagrams below we
have contracted our depiction of a directed graph using a common association:
two edges pointing in different directions between two vertices will be replaced
by a single undirected edge. For both examples, a person in position R is
radicalised (m3), M is personally motivated to attack (m4), T is personally
trained to attack, E is embedded in a gang, Oe has opportunity to perpetrate
an incident when embedded and Ol is acting as a loner. Finally S, P, F denote
the assault incident of the given type is a success, partial success or a failure
respectively.
3.3.2 Template for a lone attack crime
Assume only one skill is needed to perpetrate the crime in question (e.g. ability
to use knife, gun or a vehicle as a weapon). An RDCEG an expert might
hypothesise is given in Fig. 7.
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Figure 7: RDCEG for a lone attack.
Note that the representation expresses the hypothesis that some transitions
are modelled as impossible. For example once someone is trained they remain
so. Note that the RDCEG has one absorbing state and its first two states
are non-recurrent. The structure of the semi-Markov transition matrix is given
below.
R M T M&T O S P F I
R ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 ?
M ∗ ∗ 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 ?
T 0 0 ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0 ?
M&T 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 ?
O 0 0 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ?
S 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 ?
P 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 ?
F 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 ?
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ?
For some agencies interest might focus on the population of such criminals
at a given location. At this population level danger at time t of ω ∈ Ωt can
be characterised by the number of ω in each of the positions above. These
random variables can obviously be associated with the positions of this graph.
Alternatively identified people can either be assigned a single current position
or more commonly to a distribution over a collection of possible positions.
3.3.3 A template for a straight forward assisted crime
Next consider a slightly more complicated scenario where the trained person
needs to be embedded within a cell of conspirators to perpetrate the assault, a
cell a suspect can in principle transition in and out of. One simple hypothesised
RDCEG in this case is given in Fig. 8.
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Figure 8:
Again, note that the graph above embeds a hypothesis that training is not
forgotten. Also in distinction to the first example and to illustrate the variety
of hypotheses such templates can exhibit it is assumed that the perpetrators
of a successful or partially successful attack are killed or neutralised but failed
attackers may still be free to attack again. We keep positions Ol and Oe sep-
arate here because the vectors of edge probabilities determining the success or
failure of a loner or an enabled attacker are often quite different. A relatively
small number of states describing the critical features of the process ensures the
computation associated with learning and model selection between this model
and similar competing ones is manageable.
Perhaps most important to note is that even in this very simple model the
states of the population do not lie on a single escalating scale contrary to many
early provenly naive models of the recent past: our model captured from expert
judgments and survey information describes a more nuanced progression to code
into a probability state space. This description can be further elaborated until
it captures all hypotheses a criminologist might want to hypothesise no matter
how complex these hypotheses might be.
4 Sample Distributions and Signatures
4.1 Introduction
There are at least four reasons for collecting data during a criminal investigation:
1. to help estimate - at a population level - the numbers of those within it
who are at various rungs of escalation into potentially eventually perpe-
trating a criminal assault. This is to better target various resources both
positively dissuading those at particular stages of threat to turn away and
also of frustrating people at those rungs from being drawn into crime. An
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example of the former would be general public information of the dangers
of engaging in these processes and the latter of making access to criminal-
ising instruments, such as a radicalising electronic web personal sites.
2. to help identify those individuals who are likely to currently be on a higher
rung of the criminal ladder and might be a threat in the medium term.
This would be to help and monitor them and their families to prevent or
inhibit this progression over the medium term through social services.
3. to identify and frustrate those individuals who are now a serious threat
of perpetrating a violent assault in the immediate future, through police
action.
4. to provide evidence about the most threatening individuals that will stand
up in court and lead to their arrest and conviction.
Although concerning the same population, each one of these types of infer-
ence needs to be treated rather differently. RDCEGs of the last two cases have
already been illustrated. So for the remainder of this paper we will now focus
on the first two of these.
4.2 Bayes Rule and Feature Selection
Bayesian uncertainty handling is in principle straightforward and the generic
methodology can be immediately applied to the state space defined by an RD-
CEG like the ones discussed above. First the modeller helps the domain expert
build a prior distribution on the states. Probability judgments concerning a
criminal’s possible latent positions defined as functions of the scales illustrated
above within the threatening population are first elicited. In this context we
find that these populations first need to be partitioned into pertinent classes
defined as a function of elicited covariates defining the threat posed by a partic-
ular person within the population. The second step is to determine the sample
distribution that we might have gathered either associated with the activities of
known individuals or concerning appropriate population studies. The third step
is purely an algorithmic one. Bayes Rule is applied to discover on the basis of
the evidence available the client’s posterior probabilities about either the distri-
bution of the population of interest or their probability distribution concerning
a particular person of interest.
The first step of this process needs some care. However the methods to per-
form such an elicitation once we have an overarching structure like the RDCEG
are now widely available and have been successfully applied in a multitude of
contexts see e.g. [19, 41, 56]. We briefly illustrate this procedure for a particular
criminal setting below.
Certain aspects within the second and third steps are hazardous. New tech-
nologies [6, 19, 24] mainly applied to public health have already demonstrated
how relevant data from population surveys or complete observational experi-
ments can be used to search a space of possible plausible models within a CEG
class of a given domain. It is possible simply to adapt standard established
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Bayesian model selection techniques to this class embellishing the method we
have illustrated in our first example. With the necessary time homogeneity as-
sumptions it is straightforward to adjust these methods so that they apply to a
DCEG [8, 20, 21, 52].
However these fast closed form selection methods have mostly been applied
only to settings based on data which are complete samples of the whole popu-
lation - for one exception see [7]. In the settings considered in this paper the
data sets are usually extremely biased and furthermore data is missing not at
random. In principle this does not cause a problem - the Bayesian method
described above still applies, although these issues mean that much more care
is needed to model sample distributions accurately and to perform inference.
Two issues are especially important. First model selection must perforce lean
heavily on expert judgments about the parts of the population about whom
we have little empirical information. This is a logical necessity. Thus routine
methods used in machine learning need significant adaptation before they are
fit for purpose.
Of course successful policing is all about making inferences based on unbal-
anced information and intelligent but subjective judgments of this kind. How-
ever it does mean that it is essential for insights from criminology to be embed-
ded into any methodology if that methodology is to be successful. Otherwise
unsafe inferences will be made. Policing inferences cannot be substituted by
automatic data driven inference some would like to see. Rather collected data
can only legitimately be used to bring into better focus inferences already struc-
ture by theory and established practice using a framework that is rich enough
to embed standard inferences at its core. The RDCEG is one framework that
can aid this process.
If sufficient studies of the general population were to exist to inform the cor-
responding probability table assignments then methods based on likelihood ratio
techniques [56] exist. In this idealised setting with care data centric inferences
can provide statistics that can give more or less unequivocal numerical measures
of the strength of evidence for or against certain hypotheses. Indeed many such
experiments and studies have been performed that enable formal - and almost
objective - uncertainty handling in a related field to combine forensic activity
evidence to determine evidence to support the guilt or innocence of a suspect.
The CEG and BN framework is one of a number of a useful frameworks around
which to construct these estimates [4, 19]. However even there the extensive
studies that have been performed only comprehensively inform certain types of
criminal cases.
Note that at a population level whilst quite detailed information about crim-
inals that are actually caught and convicted of crimes - through data collected
leading to someone’s arrest and conviction - evidence is parse concerning people
who commit undetected crimes or the innocent. Fortunately the technologies
for performing both the elicitation and the Bayesian learning given such biased
information are now available. A precedent for an analogous translation is pro-
vided by the achievements in forensic science [4, 27, 45]. These methodologies
are now ready to be translated into crime prevention. The potential bias of
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the information available may be coloured by police preconceptions about the
profile of a potential perpetrator and have recently well aired in relation to the
controversies behind predictive policing e.g. [34]. Despite the output of many
studies from a formal inferential point of view it is not enough that samples
of observed suspects in a given position share a particular property with high
probability. We also need that someone in each of the other alternative be-
nign positions performs those acts with low probability. Good machine learners
working in these area acknowledge these hazards - see e.g. [30, 63] who express
extreme caution about using even state of the art machine learning techniques
to this domain.
Example 4 Consider the following type of data that is collected from surveys.
Here the hypothetical life histories of 100 known violent criminals of a particular
type have been studied and it is noted that 34 of these have a relation who has
a criminal history. Because of this it might be suggested that being embedded in
a criminal family is a predictor of whether or not another person might be such
a violent criminal.
Criminal Not criminal
Related to criminal 38 962 1000
No relation 62 x? ?
100 ?
The probability P (C|R) - a person is a criminal (event C) given he has a
relative who is also a criminal (event R) - is the probability of interest. However
the sample proportion estimates the conditional probability P (R|C) = 0.38 i.e.
conditions the wrong way round: the Prosecutor Fallacy [56].
One common attempt to solve this issue within machine learning is to then
extend the study by taking the criminal relations we have found in the study in
this way: the so called snowball sample [63]. We then find the number of these
that are not a violent criminal. This gives us a new entry which in our table
we let be 962. However this naive sampling method can still be seriously flawed
since by definition the relatives who seed this analysis are related to a violent
criminal! Unless placed within the context of a development which includes
embeddedness - for example through using an RDCEG - this biases the sample
severely. Note the use of the obvious sample proportion 0.038 as an estimate
of P (C|R) in this context is likely to be far too large. These problems persist
and indeed accumulate once we search for more than one explanatory cause.
Although snowball sampling commonly used in machine learning can sometimes
be debiased, this is only possible by making severe assumptions which in our
contexts are usually untenable [33].
A further complication here is that people of interest are rational. So - at
least as they enter more dangerous stages - we must allow for the fact that
a suspect disguise or limit the more direct indicators of their threat. So it is
essential that within the feature function selection we bear this in mind [5].
People can sometimes self identify themselves in the classes above. However if
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these are extreme stages we may need to fold in the possibility that statements
are bravado. On the other hand if someone appears to lie in a benign stage
appears then this might suggest that person is in fact actually dangerous but
in hiding. Some recent systematic ways of introducing the gaming element for
classes of CEGs is given in [61].
A final challenge is presented by the sheer volume of potentially relevant
data currently collected - most of which is irrelevant - streaming in real time
through for example online activities and CCTV images. Unless appropriately
filtered this data can be totally overwhelming. We need to first develop new
statistical and machine learning technologies to determine the functions of the
data that might be relevant to whether or not someone is in each of the given
positions in a hypothesised RDCEG. We illustrate below that once elicited the
RDCEG can be used to guide the careful choice of these functions so that state
of the art Natural Language and Image Processing technologies to be trained to
this application, for example, to estimate the hyperparameters associated with
these sample distributions [40].
So statistics with discriminatory power to differentiate the signatures of
different people in each different position are essential. Here - because a priori
it is much more likely that anyone - regardless of their indexing covariates is
much less likely to be honest than be a criminal sample are unbiased - this is
especially important. Various authors have begun to do this [39, 63] although
in an unsupported way.
4.3 Population models
Especially when appraising the effectiveness of measures designed to reduce the
probability that any individual ω ∈ Ωt will become a danger to the public, there
are some useful summary statistics we use later. These focus on the individuals
within the population and marginalise out information about interactions be-
tween ω ∈ Ωt. A useful partition of Ωt separates those whose identity is known
to the authorities ωi ∈ Kt and those ωi ∈ Kt who are not. A selection of the
covariates of ωi might typically be available, for example from those recently
released from prison. With the caveats above this information can be used to
inform our estimates. This is developed in more detail in [55].
One obvious projection on to each time slice t > 0 - conditions on certain
relevant subsets of covariates xt defining a subpopulation Ωt(xt) of interest -
focuses on the random vector of numbers N t(xt) of people in the population of
people in the different threat positions in the subpopulation. This vector can
be written as
N t(xt) , {Nt(wt,xt) : wt ∈Wt} .
We illustrate later how when the dynamics are slow enough that the ag-
gregated semi-Markov process on individuals can be well approximated by a
Markov one then the topology of the RDCEG can be straightforwardly trans-
formed into a better studied Markov process [Collazo 18, 21]. We note that
from the comments above we are typically informed much better about people
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in the more threatening states than those who are not so such samples are very
far from being multinomial. However various features of its joint distribution
can be simply calculated using the topology of the RDCEG and be used within
any decision support tool to be used on this population.
5 Radicalisation to Violent Extremism
5.1 Introduction
In the next two sections we illustrate how to structure a particular application of
the technology above into a particular domain: religious and political radicalisa-
tion leading to attacks on the general public. Henceforth call this radicalisation
to violent extremism (RVE) currently a serious threat of such assaults on the
general public in the UK - most recently from Al-Qaeda and then ISIS - and so
there is a point to such a study. Secondly there is now a vast sociological and
psychological literature about this domain giving deep understanding of some
of the processes behind this development. For a summary of some of these see
[25]. Thirdly there have recently been efforts especially within machine learning
to develop tools to harvest real time evidence to support the identification of
particular individuals who might perpetrate such crimes. This paper shows, by
using the framework of the RDCEG how these technologies can be embedded
in sociological models. For simplicity here we will focus on only those people
who will actually be part of a perpetrated attack and not those who are simply
inciters.
The study of radicalisation processes is now quite advanced. A good review
of some of the more established work in this area is given in [11]. There he points
out that most theorists think of radicalisation to violent extremism as a process
- like the one modelled above - quoting [44] “’[Radicalisation is] the end point in
a dialectic process that gradually pushes an individual towards a commitment
to violence over time”. Our first step is to translate the broad categorisations
we developed above into categories customised to this particular subpopulation.
For example, in a detailed study of one class of violent extremists [35] points to
four elements in their recruitment and capability which closely parallel the four
components of our motivation and means scales. He argues as we have that these
do not in constitute components of an escalating scale but rather four separate
parallel escalating scales. He used the term “indoctrination” for what we have
called “alienation”, “violent acculturation” for “violence”, “relations building”
for “embedding” and “training” for “training and skills”. The NYPD scales of
“pre- radicalisation” lead to “self identification” and then “indoctrination” [53].
In [12] the study of motivation for radicalisation in Denmark by [49] is dis-
cussed. These have also informed the scales we produce below. They unpick
what might be meant by alienation in the context of Islamic extremism. They
discover from their sample certain indicators of the higher alienation rungs in our
scale: unemployment/ underemployment, lack of a role in society. Experiences
of discrimination often pushes someone up this scale. Ideological justifications
26
pulls them into a group further alienating them from mainstream society. With
other authors they discover acculturation of violence as another defining feature.
The support of agencies aiming to discourage or prevent people from those
rungs which make someone a danger to society is informed by a series of de-
tailed interviews with another group. Horgan [36] found that those in their
sample dropping down our scales tended to do so not so much from a decrease
of feeling of alienation but through intense disillusionment that violent strug-
gle was an appropriate way to address injustices. This would often be paired
with a realisation that the brotherhood with whom they associated were far
from being upright and sometimes people whose attitudes and behaviours dis-
gusted the subject. This suggests that encouraging a subject to modify their
disruption rung - for example trying to convince them that violence against the
general public is never justified whatever its perceived inadequacies/sinfulness.
Convincing them of the ideological impurity of their brotherhood might provide
compelling and immediate dissuasions to some, thus disturbing their embedded-
ness. Such tools might then go in tandem with attempts to rehabilitate a person
- for example empowering them to find a fulfilling job or enjoy a normal family
life: the latter associated with much longer processes and never attractive or
attainable to some. Again the scales we give below identify when and where
such tools might be most effective.
Various documents provide advice to professionals both to identify radicali-
sation leading to violent extremism with suggestions about how to address these
issues: see for example [18, 29, 46, 47] and are used below where we relate activ-
ities to our scales. So for example in [29] indicators of being in a “concerning”
point on our alienation scale on rungs scales a5 and above is being more removed
from normal social networks than they would normally be, stated commitments
to a radical ideology and irritation or anger about contrary views. “Concern”
associated with violence (greater than v3 on our scale) would be the use of
language that advocated violence or aggression. Indicators of people deserving
“attention” would be a complete commitment to and engagement in the ideol-
ogy and almost complete disengagement with previous friends, family, strong
expressions of hostility to their “enemy” including law enforcement and gov-
ernment, and seeing violence as a necessary and legitimate instrument (rungs
a7, a8) and being prepared to plan and prepare a violent act v5, v6. We note
that these scale indicators if existing together would lead to a the highest rung
m4 in our motivation scale.
5.2 Adjusting terminology to apply to radicalisation pro-
cesses
The Alienation scale below expands the escalating scales based on SMT and
given in [65] who label states of mind openness to new world views - a3, a4,
religious/political seeking - a5, frame alignment - a6, indoctrinated - a7, a8. A
path orientates a person towards some specific alignment with a particular ideal
- for example an Islamic one - although we do not restrict ourselves to this
instance here.
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1. Benign: I am content with my life and its trajectory and the normal
evolution of mainstream society, a1.
2. Dissatisfied : I am dissatisfied with my current life and am currently look-
ing for better opportunities within it, a2.
3. Disaffected : I am disaffected with my life chances; there seems to be no
future for me, a3.
4. Converted : I am not part of this society and do not share its ideals and
aspirations. I instead have a different set of ideals aligned to my brothers
and sisters. I identify with the suffering of my kin, a4.
5. Radicalised : Some sort of revolutionary change is needed in the UK to
transform it to be consistent with my ideology and transform its politics
to be sympathetic with our beliefs and life styles. I love my kin and only
them, a5.
6. Hating : Those people representing or acquiescing with the current order
are my enemies; we must fight these people, they are filth a6.
7. Affiliated : Any acts - criminal or not - that provoke a complete and to-
tal transformation of a society so that its politics wholly supports my
ideology and codes of actions and tolerates no other are fully justified;
I wholeheartedly support those who are prepared to bring about such a
transformation; they represent me, a7.
8. Embodying : I, personally, yearn to take an active role (within my own
moral compass) to instigate this transformation, I am prepared to be
imprisoned or to die for this cause, a8.
The generic violence scale needs no modification, neither does the matrix
function defining our motivation scale. The terminology describing the motiva-
tional states can however be usefully adjusted: immune, m0, “I would find such
a narrative of RVE abhorrent and unacceptable”; benign, m1, “I am not dwelling
on these issues”; open, m2, “I might respond positively to an RVE narrative”;
aligned, m3, “I wholeheartedly support RVE”; indoctrinated, m4, “I embrace
my particular RVE narrative. This is my world view and I am determined to
be a soldier for its cause.”
5.2.1 Means
The RVE embedded, encouraged and enabled: There are two types of
RVE. Lone wolf attacks where someone acts individually and is only enabled
electronically. The second are ones where RVE need the active engagement
of other like minded people within a collection of people drawn from others
affiliated to the same ideological group. We call this local collection of people
that person’s brotherhood. This second type is especially interesting.
As has been demonstrated through benign religious groupings, for an ideo-
logical movement to have traction it usually needs be constituted by groups who
meet, care for and encourage one another. This social networking increases the
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commitment and courage of those following the ideology. For those described
as RVE it is these ends the police need to frustrate. Even those planning to
act alone therefore are most dangerous when embedded in a brotherhood. En-
gagement within a brotherhood, whilst not necessary to perpetrate and act
of violence increases the extent of the potential harm a potential perpetrator
might induce. An attempt to capture this social dynamic for RVEs below in
measurable categories.
1. Not meeting regularly with others affiliated to the same ideology - embed-
ded in contacts with other friends and family.
2. Meeting regularly remotely e.g. electronically with affiliates but most
contacts are with other friends and relatives.
3. Meeting regularly electronically and physically with others in the broth-
erhood of believers but also in ordinary contact with other friends and
relatives.
4. Meeting regularly electronically and physically with others in the broth-
erhood of believers and have reduced contacts with family and friends.
5. Meeting regularly electronically and physically with others in the broth-
erhood of believers and have minimal contacts with family and friends.
As noted before, embedding goes hand in hand with motivation each exciting
the other - reinforcing the ideological framework and acceptance of violence that
provides motivation. However for modelling purposes it is useful to separate
these two. Remedial acts or external events can change or disrupt a suspect’s
embedding immediately whilst decreasing motivation tends to move only slowly.
We note that such embedding can already be in place because of the suspect’s
kinships or naturally evolving friendship groups.
Skills to be part of an act of violence: The final element we need to
address in this model is the capabilities of an individual motivated to be part
of an attack on the general public. There are a number roles r in forms of
attack g used by radicals, each needing different levels of skill from the potential
perpetrator and making him or her more or less useful. We list the more common
roles below.
1. A mule: Need someone to demonstrate (physically or electronically) what
you do but usually little training required. These roles might be acid
attackers, or bomb mules.
2. Vehicle as a weapon: Need to be able to drive the vehicle.
3. A knife attacker: Some training and practice to do this well but no real
technical skills.
4. Attacker using fire arms: Need some training on a firing range.
5. Bomb maker: Some specific skill needed here - although such training is
available on the web if you know where to look.
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6. A strategic planner: Able to identify targets, formulate a plan of attack
and draw together participants to enact the plan - needs logistic and or-
ganisational skills.
7. Making a biological or nuclear weapon: More specific training needed here.
These abilities reflect the extent of the danger presented by an individual.
A single person can of course have many skills: for example a bomb mule may
well have also made the bomb. Note that someone who has received military
training over at least 6 months by the affiliating group is likely to be skilled in
the first 6 bullets and so is especially dangerous. Also note however that the first
three bullets are skills that need very little training. A significant proportion of
recent attacks in the UK have been of this type. These are especially difficult
for the police to frustrate because the lead time between being motivated to
make an attack and enacting that attack can be very short.
In most circumstances it should in principle be give a probability distribution
of the skills of a particular person of interest based on their likely history and
the three point scale of training. How this may be done is illustrated in the next
section.
Opportunity: Finally the individual needs the opportunity to commit the
crime. Sometimes targets will be heavily protected so this may be an issue or
increased police presence may frustrate an attack - at least forcing its postpone-
ment. Certainly in all cases someone currently held in custody cannot be party
of an attack force and is one of the instruments a government has to frustrate
an attack. These elements typically inform police operations and link closely to
the pursuit of criminal cells. The modelling of this feature is somewhat more
complex and therefore developed in a later paper see [3].
5.3 Evidence based analysis of radicalising processes
5.3.1 The RDCEG
We need to set up a description of the RDCEG which is sufficiently detailed to
capture the varieties of different ways a person can become a potential perpe-
trator but sufficiently coarse to be able to draw evidence from other individuals
who have followed life paths that have at least some features in common. It is
helpful therefore to consider first the variety of types some illustrated below and
see that the categorisations below with the right RDCEG can still be applied
to all of these. These examples are based loosely on a categorisation of young
Al Qaeda fighters in [62].
Example 5 For status: Soldier A is an immigrant and has recently returned
from 2 years of action fighting for the cause to which he is known to be affiliated.
He continues to be in electronic contact with people known to proselytise RVE.
His brother is still in action abroad and he has just made local contacts with
fellow sympathisers. On arriving in the UK he cannot find work and suffers dis-
crimination. He realises he is an alien from UK society which he now despises.
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This man scores high on all scales and is a clear and potentially enduring threat.
He may well believe in the justice of the movement, feel it is something he should
engage in himself and of course he will be familiar with the possibility of risking
death. So he scores highly on the alienation scale. From his experiences in the
conflict he is likely to be desensitised to the immorality of violent acts, so score
high on the disruption scale. He is very likely to be skilled enough to be an active
participant in an attack because of his experiences abroad. He also appears to
be embedding himself within a brotherhood in the UK through which he could
coordinate an attack on the UK public. Note that for this person being brought
up in a war zone has acculturated him to violence early in his life. By fighting
abroad he has acquired skills that enable him to perpetrate an attack. The final
element - his embedding has come last - he has found people in the UK he can
relate to. (V → T → A→ E)
Example 6 For revenge: A female UK recruit B’s lover has been savagely
killed by allies of the UK whilst he fought abroad. She now hates these allies
and is determined to take revenge. She embraces death because life no longer
holds a meaning. She is currently saving and borrowing money and plans to
travel to fight for her lover’s cause to then return to take retribution against the
nation she hates. She has had long contacts with her lover’s friends within the
UK with whom she is embedded. This woman is clearly also a threat. However
the potential threat she presents will be more delayed. It may be possible to
prevent her from travelling to be fully equipped. Her commitment to a violent
act might be entrenched or her ideological fervour for the cause may be flaky.
In time her hate provoked plan might be reappraised. Note the different order
here. She was first embedded, became violent, alienated and is about to train.
(E → V → A→ T )
Example 7 To belong: An angry alienated young man C feels it is something
he should be doing and is familiar with the possibility of risking death. He is
intelligent but has been discriminated against from a young age and has many
grievances. He had been engaging in criminal activities since his youth ending
up in prison a number of times. Since leaving prison the last time he has met
up with others who have become his close friends. He has converted to Islam
and found order and structure in his life and a mission. He now embraces his
new found faith which he understands as encouraging the violence which made
up so much of his past life and redirects this to a “good” cause. The idea that
by dying from suicide bombing he will go straight to heaven and all his sins be
forgiven appeals. Here high motivation and a brotherhood has been added to an
earlier acculturation to violence. This person is a real threat. However having
a better understanding of Islam and a separation from his current brotherhood,
replaced by another more benign version of his new religion might defuse his
threat to himself and others. Note again the different order has occurred. (V →
A→ E → T )
Example 8 For thrills: A young man D lusts after violence. He laps up
material like beheadings on the web and has recently discovered a brotherhood
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living locally who also want to perpetrate violent acts. He is happy to join
this gang who will train him to perpetrate other violence and engage with its
ceremonials and diktats so that he can get hands-on experience of a local war.
This man is dangerous. But the radicalisation is just a vehicle for expressing
his violent urges and comes as a late add on. He will remain a danger to society
whatever is done to mitigate the causes of RVE. (V → E → T → A)
The second and third cases might well respond to different stimuli both from
each other and from the first and last, so they may well be combined. The first
and last cases should be kept apart.
5.3.2 Explanatory variables
Several detailed but mainly qualitative studies of different groups of radicalised
people and their pathways to eventual crime are now available and many of
their categorisations - derived from an honest interviewee would be impossible
to observe externally on an identified but remote person. However a short list
of generic classifications could be observed and some of these are summarised
below.
Relevant explanatory variables - such as those found on a passport have been
the following. All these link in some way or other to vulnerability to RVE.
1. Home location: This is most critical because policies to counter RVE are
typically enacted locally. This also is relevant to the ability of an individual
to embed themselves in a brotherhood.
2. Gender : The majority of people who have perpetrated an attack have
been male. It depends on the type of attack but as a ballpark figure
perhaps only 5% of these have been perpetrated by women.
3. Age: About a third of people convicted of incidents associated with RVE
are between 24 and 28 with their arrest happening about 2-3 years after
first entering the highest of our motivation scale. In the West children less
than 16 and people over 50 rarely commit an act.
4. Religion: Obviously by definition all Islamic terrorists would self identify
as Muslim, usually Sunni. Similarly members of the Provision IRA self
identified as Catholic Christians.
5. Nationality : Certain national cultures seem to be more consistent with
the adoption of a violent ideology than others.
Prior probabilities for any identified person will normally reflect these cate-
gories. However it cannot be emphasised too strongly that although such cate-
gories inform our processes they provide a very biased picture of the potential of
someone being identified as a threat - see the discussion of the Prosecutor Fal-
lacy in the previous section. In particular prior probabilities must be informed
by the available complementary evidence concerning the general public.
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5.3.3 Activity level data, medium term
The next type of externally collectable data concern past events that can help
inform our scales. They apply to known or partially identified individuals al-
though local demographic information is collected on some of these and can be
used as background information.
1. Is the person an immigrant to the UK? If so are they an immigrant from a
very different culture? Have they emigrated from a risk region? These all
signify a higher probability of being higher on the alienation scale. To
the last we must add that such a person is more likely to either abhor vio-
lence or be much more acculturated than the general public. What is the
probability that they are a skilled fighter (training scale) and acquainted
with local people with radical views (so have a higher embedding score)?
2. Are they fluent in a language other than English? Such people can be more
effectively covertly targeted by radicalisers and covertly communicate with
others radicalised within an affiliation. So they can be higher on the
embedded and alienation scores.
3. Do they have a prison conviction? These suggest a higher probability of
being further up the alienation score than the general public and also
to have been in contact with those with radical views (so possibly more
embedded). If the conviction was for a violent crime or for a crime with
a high probability of associated violence (such as being part of a drug
gang) then this gives a higher probability on the violence scale.
4. Are they unemployed, underemployed or a student not engaging in their
programme? If so this suggest a higher alienation score than that of the
general public.
5. Have they travelled to risk regions and stayed for more than 6 months?
Then they are more probable to have a high training score (need to offset
this if they have relatives in the area which is an alternative explanation)
and return more acculturated with violence (a high violence score).
6. Do they enjoy a kinship relationship with someone known to be radicalised
(higher score on the embedding scale)?
7. Have they at some point in the past accessed and read radicalising web
sites on more than one occasion, or been in contact with radicalisers (a
higher alienation score)?
8. Has this person been in active communication with known radicalisers
(high alienation and embedding score)?
5.3.4 Activity level, current behaviour
These are about an identified or partially identified person’s current activity.
1. Currently accessing radicalising websites and meetings at least once a
fortnight (high alienation) [29].
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2. Openly evangelising RVE (high alienation), e.g. reposting with a posi-
tive sentiment on public electronic forums or physical meetings [43]. This
can now be analysed directly from post/repost messages by finding fea-
tures to discriminate between extremist and anti-extremist posts [64] and
combinations of behaviour changes that signal RVEs from posts [51].
3. Openly aggressive to family and past friends (high violence) [29].
4. Currently in energetic contact with known radical friends and family -
at least once a week - (high alienation and embedding) unless this
is a frequent past state in which case a sudden reduction of this might
indicate a rational act - see above - associated imminent involvement in
an incident [43]. Methods that weigh electronic links to seed individuals
already known RVE’s have been studied [13, 16].
5. Shunning usual communications with non-radicalised friends and family
(high alienation and embedding) known as “hardening” [43].
6. Saving money, trying to secure a false passport, researching travel options,
websites for weapon making and use (high training and violence).
Changes in behaviour are especially useful; they indicate previous as well as
new position. Note that some of these classifications need intelligence concerning
the RVE in this person’s network.
5.4 Sampling, questionnaires and position probabilities
Typically demographic information will be available about a particular popu-
lation as a whole so that the probability distribution of the numbers in these
categories in a given catchment can be made fairly tight. Analogous setting
suggest one good way of eliciting this prior information is to first estimate the
size of the whole population Ωt(x) for each of the explanatory categories x ∈ X′
perhaps 6-20 of these categories. These numbers will typically be estimated with
a variance which can be treated as very small and known. Typical categorisa-
tion is by geographical region, age, gender, nationality. We have found it useful
to keep separate categories for recent immigrant from war torn countries and
from prisons because these two categories can have rather different transition
probabilities than the rest of the population.
Then for each Ωt(x) : x ∈ X′ we estimate the pertinent functions of the
explanatory indicators above and then for each x ∈ X′ the expected numbers
currently in a position and of those transitioning from one position to an ad-
jacent one in the RCEG over the next transition. Usually there will be less
than 20 positions and as we have seen these transitions are sparse so this is
feasible. Various refinements of this using the Markov prior equilibrium proba-
bilities when we believe the transition probabilities are slow moving over time
are outlined in [8].
For population inferences propensities need to be translated into sample dis-
tributions over the relevant populations for each position in our RDCEG, by
covariate. Here we can use the first two lists of prompts to toggle the estimates
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towards reality. This takes a little time to set up but there are now many studies
that can lead us into reasonable ballpark figures which are usually sufficient to
discriminate policies. Recall we will have already elicited a partition of the pop-
ulation into the positions relevant to the crime. One of the points of using the
RDCEG rather than just the positions is of course that fact that there is strong
information about transition structure which the RDCEG hard wires into the
statistical model. The implied covariance structure across the positions is for
example very heterogeneous but also easily calculated using simple applications
of tower rules found in basic probability modelling. If we need to appropriately
accommodate sampling information then we will need at least the second mo-
ment properties of the probabilities in each positions. These can again be well
approximated from eliciting directly quartile bounds on the numbers, and then
using the same approximating formulae or alternatively by directly estimating
the hyperparameters of Dirichlet priors on the relevant transition probabilities:
see [19] for details.
Data we have concerning known individuals ωi ∈ Kt within the population
then can be embedded either formally by proposing sample distributions to
various measures derived from the types of activity data mentioned above or
where we simply use this information to populate the probabilities associated
with these known individuals. Using this information we might choose to review
our beliefs about ωi ∈ Kt especially those in regions with high concentrations
of the most threatening of the ωi ∈ Kt.
Of course the assessments need to be regularly revisited. But revising as-
sessments so that they better fit the developing environment is a much easier
task: typically only a few of these will need adjusting driven by changes in envi-
ronments in selected geographical or demographic regions. These will typically
result in various transition probabilities changing or be the result of changes in
numbers in various positions due to immigration or emigration.
Current activity levels inform at a population level via open source social
media. Activities and especially changes in activities can be informative about
changing transitions and provided that based round an expert validated RD-
CEG can often be naively accommodated using standard updates of the relevant
transition probabilities. Often the inferences we undertake concern an individ-
ual’s potential to act violently or to repent. The RDCEG can be used to start
building a model of the threat posed by that particular individual into the fu-
ture. More is known about the position of that given individual through their
current activities. Those that are not known can be informed by the population
probabilities elicited as above.
6 Agency RVE for Decision Support
6.1 Introduction
We have outlined a fine grained categorisation above. However this is often
usefully coarsened by different government agencies who will have different re-
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sponsibilities and focus. For example policy implementations directed at simply
dissuading as many of the general public in involving themselves in RVE need
to be targeted at those on the lower rungs of the ladders while remedial policies
aimed at identified individuals are quite rare. For this purpose we therefore
tend to focus on the early signs of radicalisation whilst the most threatening
manifestations are handed over to other agencies. We illustrate the value of a
statistical model for this type of decision support in the example below.
In 2010 the UK Home Office needed to evaluate the effectiveness of past
programmes and the promise of future ones. Various types of portfolios of
Prevent programmes were designed to enact early interventions designed to dis-
courage vulnerable people being recruited into RVE. Some programmes were
implemented through statutory requirements by various organisations. Exam-
ples of these included new policies and protocols enacted by social workers and
probation officers and demands for attendance registers at universities. Others
resourced the development of tools to identify people in danger of being (fur-
ther) radicalised through their online behaviours, development of new methods
to disrupt RVE propaganda and others to promote citizenship from those poten-
tial clients, educational programmes for schools and threatened neighbourhoods,
training of personnel at mosques and other activities such as the English lan-
guage training of Muslim monks. Government sought guidance in the wisest
deployment of its resources to best mitigate threats of RVE into the medium
and long term using such instruments.
Any decision support system had on the one hand to be formal enough to
be transparent, defensible and so able to accommodate any available data [56].
On the other it needed to be credible to sociologists. This section builds on
early work outlined in [50]. We show how the RDCEG - whose development
was prompted by this application - can form the basis of a fit for purpose model
of each individual in the process. We then demonstrate how a population model
can be constructed from this RDCEG. Since the time of our original analyses
a much richer data set has become available through publicly available posts
on social media [1, 2, 10, 17, 39, 48, 60]. We will briefly illustrate how such
information, most commonly used to police the internet, can also be used to
better inform our models so that the overall efficacy of the evaluations above
can be enhanced.
Information concerning training and the opportunities for criminal attacks
could be truncated at boundaries of threat. Anyone who was in the course of
the process reaching positions leading to these would be referred to other agen-
cies and the police. Decision support would therefore focus on states informing
countermeasures to address alienation and inhibit too many in the population
being embedded in a threat group. Any population data used in the analysis
needs to be in the public domain. In 2010 this was provided by some very
scant survey information. Currently there is more public social media data al-
though this data is patchy and very biased. So the most vital information comes
from the prior information elicited from experts about the nature and extent of
drifts within the positions of the population and the success or otherwise of the
programmes themselves, as briefly discussed above.
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6.1.1 An Initial RDCEG and its positions
An RDCEG of a typical ω ∈ Ωt who might benefit from a Prevent scheme is
given below where we have omitted the demographic and geographic categories
x ∈ X′⊆ X. We use our RVE scales discussed above.
Numbers Positions Description
Nt1 w1 = (m1, e0) benign & not embedded
Nt2 w2 = (m2, e0) open to radicalisation & not embedded
Nt3 w3 = (m2, e1) open to radicalisation & partially embedded
Nt4 w4 = (m2, e2) open to radicalisation & embedded
Nt5 w5 = (m3, e0) aligned & not embedded
Nt6 w6 = (m3, e1) aligned & partially embedded
Nt7 w7 = (m3, e2) aligned & embedded
Nt8 w8 = (m4, e0) indoctrinated & not embedded
Nt9 w9 = (m4, e1) indoctrinated & partially embedded
Nt10 w10 = (m4, e2) indoctrinated & embedded
Assume that when there is a high probability someone lay in the last 4 states
at any future time then they would be referred to other agencies as a potential
danger. Suppose that we frame Prevent strategies in terms of minimising the
number of people who at some point in the future end up in one of these four
states, and a severe danger when arriving in the last. The simplest possible
transitions where double directions are represented by an undirected edge is
given below. The full RDCEG simply copies the same structure for each possible
value of covariates. Most of the positions in this system are associated with the
same (m, e) label but different covariates will be in the same stage and so enjoy
the same colours. The most critical positions are given in bold and the severe
one is boxed.
Figure 9: An initial RDCEG for modelling the portfolios which are part of the
Prevent strategies.
Let Gt = {gti(d,x)}, i = 1, 2, . . . , 11, d ∈ D, x ∈ X′⊆ X be a matrix which
depends on the suite d ∈ D of policies adopted and the covariates x ∈ X′⊆ X
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but whose structure of zeroes is assumed here to be policy independent and
covariate independent. Thus for all values d ∈ D, x ∈ X′⊆ X the shape of the
semi-Markov transition matrix Gt takes the structural form given below.
rungs m1, e0 m2, e0 m2, e1 m2, e2 m3, e0 m3, e1 m3, e2 m4, e0 m4, e1 m4, e2 i
m1, e0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ?
m2, e0 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 ?
m2, e1 0 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 ?
m2, e2 0 0 ∗ 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 ?
m3, e0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 0 ?
m3, e1 0 0 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 0 0 ∗ ∗ ?
m3, e2 0 0 0 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 ?
m4, e0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 0 ∗ 0 ?
m4, e1 0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 ∗ ?
m4, e2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 ∗ 0 ?
i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Let ρti(x,d), i = 1, 2, . . . , 10 denote the probability any ω ∈ Ωt lies in the
ith state at time t given they are not in the immune state for each considered
subset of covariates x ∈ X′⊆ X, each possible suite of decisions d ∈ D and in
quarter t. Now write
ρt(x,d) , (ρt1(x,d), ρt2(x,d), . . . , ρt10(x,d))
ρ−t (x,d) , (ρt1(x,d), ρt2(x,d), . . . , ρt6(x,d))
ρ+t (x,d) , (ρt7(x,d), ρt8(x,d), ρt9(x,d), ρt10(x,d))
All the states of this Markov chain are transient other that the immune state
which is absorbing.
6.2 Population Modelling and Policy Appraisal
The policies of this agency will be often directed at those who lie in the first 6
states. The aim of the policies are to prevent as many individuals as possible
entering the other states at future time step when a suite of policies are in place.
The predicted effect of the policies can then be measured.
On the other hand the last 4 states will define the extent of failure of any
portfolio of policies. A failure could be said to occur when anyone reaches the
last 4 states at some time and an extreme failure when they reach the last. So
ρ+t (x,d) and particularly ρt10(x,d), t ≥ t0, for an as yet unknown ω ∈ Ωt will be
of central interest. The weight given to each of these will depend on the client’s
utility function - an internal issue which needs to balance both the extent of
the problem with its immediacy. Here it is sufficient to point out that these
quantities are simple functions of the terms above.
Example 9 Suppose we consider only policies associated with the subpopulation
x = x∗ ∈ X′ - perhaps several potential policies aimed at reducing alienation of
men who are currently in the age range 16-26 years who live in a particular part
of a given city. Government say they want to finance the new policy δ = δ∗ ∈ ∆
to add to its current suite that minimises the probability θ∗(d∪δ) someone in the
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current population at some point will reach position w10. This is a simple func-
tion of the current probabilities ρt(x,d) and the elicited entries of the sequence of
future semi-Markov transitions. Let G∗ (d ∪ δ) , {g∗ti(d ∪ δ,x∗)}1≤i≤11 where
g∗ti(d ∪ δ,x∗) , gti(d ∪ δ,x∗) 1 ≤ i 6= 10 ≤ 11
but where we make w10 an absorbing state by setting g
∗
t10(d ∪ δ,x∗) to be a row
with all components zero but the 10th which is a one. This new semi-Markov
transition matrix now has two absorbing states w10 and i. It is then easily
checked that θ∗(d∪ δ) is exactly the probability of being eventually absorbed into
w10 rather than i under the action of G
∗
t (d ∪ δ) from the starting vector ρt(x,d).
Example 10 Now suppose the aim is to prevent as many as possible of the pop-
ulation entering a failure rather than extreme failure state. This calculation is
just as simple. The new policy δ = δ∗ ∈ ∆ minimising the probability θ+(d∪δ) is
now the sum of the probabilities of landing in the 4 new absorbing states associ-
ated with states w7, w8, w9, w10 associated with the current probabilities ρt(x, d)
and the different transition matrix G+t (d ∪ δ) ,
{
g+ti(d ∪ δ,x∗)
}
1≤i≤11elicited
entries of the sequence of future semi-Markov transitions. Let G∗ (d ∪ δ) ,
{g∗ti(d ∪ δ,x∗)}1≤i≤11 where
g+ti(d ∪ δ,x∗) , gti(d ∪ δ,x∗) 1 ≤ i 6= 7, 8, 9, 10 ≤ 11
but where we make w10 an absorbing state by setting g
+
ti(d ∪ δ,x∗) to be a row
with all components zero but the ith which is a one, i = 7, 8, 9, 10.
Note that if the decision maker wanted to trade off these two attributes and
she had preference independent attributes then she would simply choose the
policy δ to minimise a linear function of these two scores that function a crite-
rion weight that would reflect their relative priority [56]. Usually each Prevent
project had its own small demographic so its portfolios could be disaggregated
and impacts assessed individually and the scores then sum, weighted by the
numbers believed to be in each explanatory class x ∈ X′. All such calculations
are simple to make once the the elicited scores are there and can be used to
initialise and explain why potential acts are good or bad.
But is it feasible to elicit the * entries in the different transitions? For each
x ∈ X′⊆ X and suite of policy options d ∈ D there are 25 such probabilities if
we use the row sum to one condition to determine probabilities in the immune
column i given by ?. However only at most a small number of these transition
will depend on x and d. So we expect less than 100 such elicitations to be
necessary. This order of magnitude makes the elicitation non-trivial but cer-
tainly feasible [9, 56]. Adjustment of probabilities in the light of unpredicted
dramatic events occurring in the wider world not embedded in the model struc-
ture such as pertinent outbreaks of war, police outrages especially when such
events are given wide news coverage are sometimes needed. However if curated,
such adaptations are usually straightforward to perform once the early quantifi-
cations are in place. We emphasise that the given RDCEG is illustrative of the
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simplest plausible model and others might be better supported. However it is
of about the order of magnitude most agencies might need and so adequate for
illustrative processes.
6.3 Population Modelling
Deliberative decision support outlined below can be fashioned to respond to
changing circumstances. It has been noted that the transition times between
positions in the early stages of radicalisation are also usually quite slow. In
this case this gradual development can therefore be well approximated as a
quarterly time series. Any ω ∈ Ωt would remain or move up or down one rung
of the measures in that three month window or during that time renounce the
process completely and drop into the immune category. So for this model of
early developments into RVE, because the probabilities of transitioning into
a non-absorbing state were not large, the RDCEG above can in fact be well
approximated by a simpler Markov rather than semi-Markov process. This
simplifies further evaluation.
The early process to full affiliation often takes time. So little is lost espe-
cially when used for a population study where interest lies in the overall effect
of a Prevent scheme rather than its effect on a given person by assuming this is
actually a Markov rather than semi-Markov process: all the adjacent position
except the immune state which is absorbing will have small associated probabil-
ities and so are likely to occur at most once in the quarter. Most of the non-zero
transition probabilities in this table need to be elicited using expert judgments.
This simplifies the analysis even further because then for many purposes the
shape of transition matrix H˜t of this Markov approximation of Gt which we
assume here applies to transitions made in a 3 month period, for each given
value of the covariate vector x would then take the structural form given below.
rungs m1, e0 m2, e0 m2, e1 m2, e2 m3, e0 m3, e1 m3, e2 m4, e0 m4, e1 m4, e2 i
m1, e0 ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ?
m2, e0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 0 ?
m2, e1 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 ?
m2, e2 0 0 ∗ ∗ 0 ∗ 0 0 0 0 ?
m3, e0 0 ∗ 0 0 ∗ ∗ 0 ∗ 0 0 ?
m3, e1 0 0 ∗ 0 ∗ ∗ 0 0 ∗ ∗ ?
m3, e2 0 0 0 ∗ 0 ∗ ∗ 0 0 0 ?
m4, e0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 0 ∗ ∗ 0 ?
m4, e1 0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 ∗ ∗ ∗ ?
m4, e2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ∗ 0 ∗ ∗ ?
i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Note that we simply now have an additional set of 10 diagonal elements. It
may be useful to write
H˜t =
[
Ht it
0 1
]
where 0 denotes a 10-row vector of zeros and it a 10-column vector of the prob-
ability someone will transition into an immune state from the other states. The
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individual analysis given above translates seamlessly into a population model
where the focus moves onto the relationships between the numbers in the popu-
lation that might lie in each position at any one time. For the decision support
for this agency for a subset of covariates x ∈ X′⊆ X, each possible suite of
decisions d ∈ D and in quarter t the authorities utility function will usually
depend upon N t(x,d) , (Nt1(x,d), Nt2(x,d), . . . , Nt10(x,d)), for t ≥ t0 where
t0 is the current time. Let Nt(x,d) be the total population of people with
the value of covariates x under the decision d ∈ D. Usually Nt(x,d) with
mean µt(x,d) will depend on d only as a response to immigration/emigration
policies, replacements and detention orders expressed within the suite d. Let
µt(x, d) , (µt1(x, d), µt2(x, d), . . . , µt10(x, d)). In this context Nt(x, d) and
(µt(x, d)) will be relatively well known, will have a small variance and can be
based on publicly available geographical and demographic information. This
means there are simple formulae that approximate well the dependence struc-
ture. For example assuming H˜t is a good approximation we note that these
proportions s quarters ahead will be given by
ρt0+s(x, d) = ρt0(x, d)H
(s)
t0
where H
(s)
t0 ,
s∏
j=1
Ht0+j . In particular under the hypothesis of time homogeneity
Ht = H , t ≥ t0 then H(s)t0 = Hs.
When considering the current states data concerning ρt(x, d) , (ρt1(x, d),
ρt2(x, d), . . . , ρt10(x, d)) where ρti(x, d) , µti(x,d)µt(x,d) is often poor. This is where
expert judgments are vital. However these parameters can be inherited from
our person centric analysis by rolling forward the transition matrix in the way
we described above. These conditional probabilities will of course be uncertain.
However many Bayesian models allow this to be taken into account - see the
Dirichlet analysis in Appendix 8.1 and see [20, 21] so that this uncertainty
appropriately informs the expected utility scores in any analysis.
At a population level, the population process {N t(x,d) : t ≥ t0, d ∈ D,x ∈
X′⊆ X} can be embedded into a flow graph [54] and then if necessary a 2 time
slice DBN [41]. Indeed this is what we did for a much simpler class in [50].
However this final translation is now unnecessary. Having established the for-
mal semantics of the RDCEG the processes can be represented much more
transparently directly in most cases.
6.4 Embedding recent Twitter analyses: examples of data
accommodation
Although the data concerning the progression of the small proportion of the
general public in the early stages of a path towards RVE used to be sparse,
publicly available data from social media has provided new indications of both
the depth of support for various such organisations and also those specific indi-
viduals that might be at risk of being drawn into violence against the general
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public. A proper review of some of this exciting new work is beyond the scope
of this article. So we will focus on just one stream of this work which concerns
the use of Twitter. After a brief review of some pertinent observations made by
the authors of [63, 64], we reinterpret their findings so that they can be used to
inform our particular inferential schemes.
First these authors distil the enormous data concerning Twitter communi-
cations between ISIS supporters into three binary measures concerning a par-
ticular individual. They label these as Sentiment Tendency (ST), Ego Network
Extremism Support (ENES) and Mention Network (MN). ST measures rely on
the idea that if a person is an ISIS supporter then they are likely to show positive
sentiments towards ISIS whilst others will tend to display neutral or negative
sentiment. They therefore count the proportion of positive tweets concerning
ISIS. If this proportion is > 0.5 that person is classified as having positive senti-
ment for ISIS. The second ENES measure is based on an observation that a user
high on our alienation scale is likely to be followed by at least one with similar
sentiment whilst others like journalists and researchers would not. ENES is an
indicator of whether a given person has at least one follower with a positive
sentiment. Finally the MN measure is based on the idea that extremist tweets
are likely to be mentioned by someone high on the alienation scale. If that user
also has a high sentiment then the indicator on MN is one. Validation experi-
ments against the results of machine learning techniques simply based on these
scores using simple naive Bayes methods - actually one of the more successful
and entirely compatible with our approach - achieved around an 80% success
against the test set of expertly classified Tweets.
This work is very interesting and demonstrates the promise of this type of
data synthesis. However the choice of these statistics have been chosen through
common sense rather than the consideration of the possible pathways Tweeters
might be on. The measures all reflect where the Tweeter might be currently
positioned and so in the notation above inform ρt0 . Here we note that within the
semantics developed above the ST feature broadly corresponds to a measure of
someone’s motivation position≥ m2. Both ENET and MN indicators mentioned
above are indicators of embedding levels ≥ e1.
How could we use the development above to provide more promising indi-
cators. Well the first suggestion would be to use a second sentiment indicator
which not only promoted ISIS but also violence to the general public associated
with anything. This would help tighten the motivation score. If it is possible to
discover whether the person of interest is geographically close to the follower or
the mentioner then this is further evidence that this person is more likely to be
embedded.
A second measure would more closely link to transitions. It is well known
that longitudinal statistical analyses are far more informative about popula-
tions than cross sectional studies. So here - as emphasised by [51] changes in
behaviour is more indicative. Notice that someone who begins to retweet ISIS
propaganda might have made a transition. Similarly someone who stop Tweet-
ing materials seems to have made a transition. However the transition could
be one where they have become immune or alternatively have gone into elec-
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tronic hiding because they are close to perpetrating a violent incident. Each
of these data concerning change helps us to re-estimate transition probabilities
perhaps using the estimate of that person’s current state. Such information
can be used formally provided that we have elicited probabilities of these mea-
sured electronic activities. So given current ISIS operandi what are their cur-
rent instruction concerning electronic communications to those about to attack
civilian targets? This will inform the choice of probability. Such information is
ephemeral and so needs regular revision. However by assuming the adversary is
rational even without internal intelligence it is possible to make predictions of
what such instructions might be [61].
Note that these sort of arguments enable the construction of more nuanced
statistics which nevertheless admit volume processing and are still open to all
the validation methodologies applied to those chosen by [63] because they are
constructed through prior out of sample methods.
Finally by processing this type of date in a Bayesian way we can import
many of the useful factorisations of a problem that have been found useful in
forensic science. Here we will restrict ourselves to the mention of just one such
example. In forensic science trace evidence is critical. For example a number
of glass fragments are found by a forensic scientist when examining the jacket
of a suspect. The question is the strength of this evidence in indicating that
this person was at the scene of a crime where a window was broken. It has
been strongly argued that to assess the strength of this evidence it is important
to consider three questions: - What were the probabilities such glass fragments
come from the window broken in the incident or from somewhere else (transfer)?
Given other information about the incident concerning the activities of the sus-
pect between the incident, the arrest and retrieval what is the probability that
this number of fragments were discovered (persistence) and how many of the
fragments can we expect the scientist to retrieve given the number of fragments
on the jacket (retrieval)? Asking these questions about the evidence actually
found conditional on the person being innocent and then conditional on being
guilty, in conjunction with the prior information, can then by Bayes Rule be
used to construct the suspect’s guilt or innocence. The innocent probabilities
are informed by physical models of shattering glass plus sample surveys measur-
ing the number of glass fragments on different types of people, the persistence
of glass fragments on jackets of various kinds and on experiments concerning
percentage retrieval of fragments known to be on a jacket [4].
Analogous constructions can be crafted in this domain. Consider for example
evidence provided by a number of retweets successfully identified as coming form
an ISIS source made by a suspect. These incriminating items have been the
result of the same three processes. Working backwards these need to have been
retrieved by the researcher at the time of the search, these had to have persisted
between the time of the original ISIS post and these must have been sourced
from this particular place. Each of these processes has its own probabilities
for someone who is on each of the positions in our RDCEG above. Just as for
forensic evidence, by carefully unpicking each of these aspects in turn we can
hope to properly populate the sample distribution of the evidence and hence
43
calculate our new position probabilities for this individual. Detailed numerical
illustrations of this process will be reported later.
7 Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated how a simple discrete Bayesian analysis can sup-
port the systematic forecasting of assault crimes and the evaluation of suites of
policy designed to mitigate these threats. It has been shown how detailed and
thoughtful sociological modelling of this area can be. This can then be trans-
formed into a well tuned quantitative tool, which to able encode this expert
judgment. It can also be calibrated and adjusted in the light of the types of
patchy data that might be available in ways illustrated above. The formal em-
bedding then provides the appropriate inputs to a full Bayesian decision support
system. This in turn is able to quickly produce initial scores concerning the ef-
ficacy of different candidate policies for discussion, adaptation and adoption by
a variety of different agencies. One critical feature of these models is that they
are fashioned around constructs that are commonly used within this domain.
This means that the rationale behind each evaluation can be fed back to the
user in a transparent way for criticism and modification. In this way the anal-
ysis can support rather than override these often sensitive decision processes,
and decisions can be scrutinised and if adequate, justified to other government
agencies as well as the general public. We also illustrated how the granularity
of a probability model so constructed could be customised to the needs of a
particular agency so that the supporting model was not overly complicated.
There are two critical issues that emerged from this study. First it has
been shown that it is essential for informed prior judgments to be drawn into
any analysis. Of course such judgments should be informed by as much em-
pirical evidence that can be made available and the Bayesian paradigm guides
this accommodation. However for absolutely justified confidentiality and eth-
ical constraints, and indeed the depth of current survey information there are
currently many gaps in this empirical evidence base we would ideally use in this
domain. Furthermore the interpretation of what data we can collect tends to
be ephemeral because of the rationality of the adversary. These conditions are
unlikely to change in the near future. It follows that judgments need to be made
based on informed reflections of criminologists. Bayesian models are especially
useful in this type of domain because they provide an established methodol-
ogy for systematically addressing such environments and accommodate what
evidence we do have into the support system.
Secondly to actually implement the technology we describe here proper suites
of template RDCEGs need to be developed in close collaboration with the ap-
propriate agencies. This will obviously take a little time: the templates provided
here are meant as simple exemplars of properly elicited structures. And once
these structures are elicited these still need to be populated with probabilities.
It is hoped that the efficacy of embarking on this activity has the potential of
being extremely fruitful and worthwhile.
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Here attention has focused on a single type of crime. However it is important
to note that wider resource allocation across domains can also be addressed by
these models. Tools to perform Bayesian decision analysis to best mitigate
crime of many different types can be built in a similar way. To forecast the
consequences of allocating resources against one criminal activity to another we
can then simply compare their calculated consequences. Provided that there is
an agreement as to the utility function to use, a direct application of an RDCEG
Bayesian analysis can guide this resource allocation. For example if the aim is
to reduce the number of civilian deaths in the life of the current parliament
then once the necessary RDCEGs have been elicited and populated with the
necessary edge probabilities, this becomes a simple calculation. Of course such
probabilities can be contentious as can the appropriate choice of utility function.
But at least we have a framework within which rational discussion of the various
options can take place.
In 2010 we explored the use of the DBN for evaluating Prevent models [50].
Within this short study it became apparent that an alternative Bayesian model
to the DBN that was based on a semi-Markov process would be more consistent
and compatible with the elicited expert judgments we needed to make and
would provide an even better platform for decision support. This prompted the
development of the RDCEG and the work described here.
Of course the RDCEG is only one tool of many to apply to the study of
criminal behaviour. It is especially useful when the focus of the study is on the
threat posed by individual criminals and the nature and extent of a particular
criminal population. However especially when supporting the pursuit of criminal
gangs there are at least two other vital components of the processes: the real
time networking activities of the gangs and the geographical nature of threats
as these develop over time. The population models described in this paper only
indirectly use such information which needs to be imported from these two other
processes.
So our next task is to report the design specific real time integrating system
that draws the three different decision support systems into a single coherent
structure, symbiotically allowing information flow between the three systems
and harmonising their outputs. An Integrating Decision Support System [9, 42]
that provides a single consistent predictive tool to support police operations in
real time in their pursuit of violent criminals is now conceived and its imple-
mentation is currently being investigated. This work will be reported in the
forthcoming paper [3].
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8 Appendix
8.1 Furnishing the topology of an RDCEG with probabil-
ities
To embellish an infinite event tree into a probability tree which fully specifies
the evolution of a unit in the described population we need to elicit only two
components from the domain expert:
1. For each situation v ∈ S(T ) a distribution for the holding time T (v, t),
i.e. the time the unit stays in that situation before moving to one of its
children after arriving at v at time t.
2. the conditional probability vector (cpv) pij(t) associated with one repre-
sentative floret F(vij), vij ∈ S(T ), vij ∈ uj from each stage uj ∈ U of
the elicited staged tree. This vector specifies the probabilities of the next
step of a unit from vij to one of its children as a function of the time t it
arrived at vij . Note that by definition of a stage, pij(t) can depend on the
index j of the stage but not the index i of the representative situation.
We then start to colour the tree. Often situations which share characteristics
of escalation but with different background covariates will be identified into the
same stage.
The time taken for transitions from one state to the next will typically be
slow but will accelerate up the tree. So we have a genuine semi-Markov process
here and what is technically known as an RDCEG. This holds for both known
and unknown individuals.
The stages {ui : 0 ≤ i ≤ k} are simply the non-sink superpositions. For each
component of pii the transition pobabilities pi are defined by pii, i = 0, 1, . . . , 5.
As time advances on each of the units and their progress evolves, the posterior
distributions of the probabilities pii associated with stage ui can be summarized
by ki parameters 1 ≤ i ≤ k, which can be expressed as the posterior means
α+ij/
∑
j′ α
+
ij′ of the probabilities for each of the emanating edges and an effective
sample size measure
∑
j′ α
+
ij′ of the accuracy of these assessments (see [19, 20]).
Thus setting pi1qpi2, . . .qpik and assigning a Dirichlet D(α0j (pii)) prior density
to each where α0j = (α
0
1(pii), α
0
2(pii), . . . , α
0
ki
(pii)) a priori, when
∑ki
j=1 piij = 1,
piij > 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ ki, we have,
p(pii) =
Γ(α01(pii) + α
0
2(pii) + . . .+ α
0
ki
(pii))
Γ(α01(pii)) . . .Γ(α
0
ki
(pii))
ki∏
j=1
pi
α0j (pii)
ij
on each component pii , i = 1, 2, . . . , k gives a conjugate analysis. Here the
separation of the likelihood above gives qipii|x a posteriori. Each of these stage
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parameters pii also have a Dirichlet distribution where the hyperparameters
α+i (pii) of the posterior density are linked to the corresponding prior hyperpa-
rameters α0i (pii) by the linear equation
α+i (pii) = α
0
i (pii) + ni
where ni = (ni,1, ni,2, . . . , ni,ki) which is the vector of the number of incidents
ni,r when a unit arriving at i then passes along the edge r, r = 1, 2, . . . , ki. Note
that in particular if we are comparing model classes of C a fast model selection
algorithm is available which uses the sum of the log Bayes Factor as a score
function to find the MAP model in this class.
Conjugate learning in non-dynamic CEG’s can accommodate not only sam-
pling schemes but also causal experimental data and is now well documented
[19, 31, 56]. Learning schemes can be devised - even if these probabilities are
believed to drift in time often within a closed form analysis [31, 32]. These meth-
ods and the formulae closely resemble analogous learning in discrete Bayesian
Networks under full sampling of the net [23, 56]. For estimation of transition
times which can be undertaken independently within this model class see [8].
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